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Aviation Security by consent using the Controlled Cognitive Engagement (CCE) 
alternative screening programme.
Abstract
Aviation security measures rely on public acceptance of the trade-off between civil liberties 
and public protection. Currently, all aviation passengers travelling to the US on an American 
carrier from non-U.S. locations undergo screening interview based on detection of suspicious 
signs, an approach which is not supported by psychological research. An alternative, 
Controlled Cognitive Engagement (CCE) was shown in a series of field trials to be more 
effective than suspicious signs methods in detecting deception during security interviews. 
However, CCE asks passengers to satisfy agents that answers to questions are veridical, which 
raises a concern that CCE might be viewed as too intrusive. Here, 120 genuine air passengers 
provided anonymous feedback regarding their experience of screening. CCE-screened 
passengers reported their experience as significantly more enjoyable, no less intrusive nor less 
acceptable than the current procedure, and were ‘promoters’ of the technique whereas those in 
the suspicious signs condition were ‘detractors’. Winning and maintaining the respect and 
approval of the traveling public is an important consideration in the task of securing freedom 
of movement and public safety.
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1. Introduction
Aviation security measures rely on public acceptance of the trade-off between civil 
liberties and public protection. Passengers traveling by air are familiar with the multiple 
layers of security at national and international airports. Identifying threats to security of 
aviation presents significant and evolving challenges. In this context, it is important to 
establish that security measures have the support of the travelling public.
The U.S. Transport Security Administration (TSA) was established in 2001 following 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City and is responsible for day-to-day security 
operations for passenger air transportation (Aviation & Transport Security Act, 2001). 
Currently, the U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program 
(AOSSP) requires aircraft operators to ‘adopt and implement a Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA)- approved security program for all scheduled passenger and public 
charter passenger operations’ (p.1.1, AOSSP, 2014). Chapter 11 of AOSSP requires all 
passengers travelling to the United States on an American carrier departing from non-U.S. 
locations be subject to a screening interview while in possession of all accessible property 
and checked baggage. The TSA mandatory screening interview, which occurs pre-check-in or 
at the time of check-in, comprises several elements including a documentation check, a series 
of baggage control questions, and observations of passengers’ behaviour.
Billions of dollars have been invested in aviation security procedures (United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2011), but the cost and effectiveness of these procedures 
is often questioned (Gillen & Morrison, 2015; Stuart & Mueller, 2014; Weinberger, 2010), 
particularly when events suggest they may be less than effective, and where procedures have 
not been empirically validated (United States Government Accountability Office, 2015; 
2017). Many aviation security procedures rely on identifying behavioral indicators (e.g., 
British Security Industry Association, 2008; Reddick, 2004), referred to as ‘suspicious signs’. 
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The AOSSP Chapter 11 screening interview is one such example, where passengers are asked 
a series of questions that are the same for every passenger, during which screeners look for 
suspicious indicators. These indicators concern non-verbal behaviours (e.g., agitation and 
sweating) and appearance (e.g., being appropriately dressed) which are believed to be 
indicators of threat and deceit.   
We and others have previously highlighted a lack of theoretical or empirical support 
for this type of screening interview (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Ormerod & Dando, 2015). 
In response, we developed Controlled Cognitive Engagement (CCE) as an alternative 
interview screening method. CCE embodies six theoretically supported and empirically 
validated features that can discriminate deceivers from truth tellers, a deceptive passenger 
being viewed as a security threat. Working alongside U.K. and U.S. government 
organizations, we carried out a series of randomized-control, double-blind field trials of these 
two aviation security-screening methods across a number of international airports. Both mock 
and real passengers passed through a security interview for long-haul flights into the US 
traveling with two large US carriers. Over an 8-month period, 204 passengers were 
incentivized to attempt to pass through security undetected while giving untruthful answers to 
security questions. Over the duration of the field trial the base rate of mock passengers to 
genuine passengers was 1:1000. Security agents trained to use CCE detected 66% of 
deceptive passengers compared with less than 5% using the mandated behavioral indicator 
recognition method. 
1.2. Security by Consent
CCE may be more effective, but is it acceptable to passengers?  If not, there is a risk 
that airlines may be reluctant to use the method, despite its effectiveness as a security 
procedure. Although short in duration, typically 3 minutes, the CCE security interview 
demands more of passengers than the current suspicious signs method. In the case of the 
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latter, passengers are passive receivers of a series of routine questions, most of which can be 
quickly and easily answered typically in one word (yes/no). Indeed, in our data collected 
during the trials (e.g., Ormerod & Dando, 2015), we observed frequent flyers answering 
questions before they had been asked in entirety.  CCE, on the other hand, expects passengers 
to actively participate in the process of security, conversing with the security screener in an 
informal manner, yet providing personal information. As the conversation progresses, they 
are expected to satisfy the screener that their answers to earlier questions are veridical. This 
raises a concern that, despite its success rates, CCE might be viewed as intrusive and 
therefore less acceptable than other methods. 
Winning and maintaining the respect and approval of the traveling public is an 
important consideration in the task of securing freedom of movement and public safety. In a 
law enforcement context, it has long been argued that public cooperation for enforcement, 
compliance and increased anti-terror security measures diminishes proportionately the 
necessity for use of compulsion and physical force for achieving objectives (see Albrecht, 
Dow, Plecas, & Das, 2014; Grieve, 2015; Huq, Tyler, & Schulhofer, 2011). In other domains, 
non-compulsory security measures to protect financial information, personal data and reduce 
the risk of fraud are improved where users are consulted, and behavior is positively 
encouraged rather than simply mandated (see Suh, & Han, 2003; Jones, McCarthy, Halawi, 
Mujtaba, 2010).
Those tasked with ensuring freedom of movement and public safety in aviation 
security contexts face a series of competing demands. One important consideration is that air 
passengers have choice. For example, when flying from non-U.S. locations into the U.S.A. 
passengers are able to choose their carrier. Those who choose to travel with non-U.S. carriers 
are not subject to the same mandatory screening interview prior to or at the time of check-in. 
This is a significant difference in passengers’ initial security experiences across carriers (e.g., 
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U.S. vs. non-U.S. carrier). Were passengers to question the validity and necessity of an 
alternative security-screening technique or refuse to participate in a security conversation, 
this would create significant delays. Passenger numbers might reduce if they perceived their 
experience might be better with another carrier. For service orientated industries such as 
aviation, perceptions of customer service are fundamental when choosing among rivals (e.g., 
Shankar, Smith, & Rangaswamy, 2003; Arif, Gupta, & Williams, 2013) and so gauging 
acceptance of novel participatory security methods is important. 
Past research indicates that passenger satisfaction with security screening is not stable 
over time, and that waiting time is not the most significant determinant of passenger 
satisfaction (e.g., Clemes et al., 2008; Gkritza, Niemer, & Mannering, 2006; Arif, Gupta & 
Williams, 2013). Safety and security are reported to be some of the most important service 
quality dimensions in international air travel (Clemes et al., 2008), with passenger 
satisfaction apparently influenced most by perceived service fairness and procedural justice 
(Sindhav et al., 2006). Where fairness perceptions are negative, customer satisfaction reduces 
significantly and customer responses are intense, immediate and enduring (Seiders & berry, 
1998). 
1.3. The Current Study
The research reported here concerns genuine air customers’ feedback regarding their 
pre check-in security experience. Using opportunity sampling, these data were collected 
during the field trial of suspicious signs and CCE methods. Screening using CCE took no 
longer than the suspicious signs method and all passengers experienced the same procedure 
in terms of their journey through the pre check-in security process - the only difference was 
the screening technique (CCE vs. Suspicious Signs). Airline passengers, blind to the field 
trial, were flying from London Heathrow Airport to the USA and gave verbal responses 
concerning their experience of pre check-in security screening. 
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2. Materials and Methods
An opportunity sample of 120 genuine aviation passengers traveling to two major US 
cities from London Heathrow Airport were approached by a researcher immediately post 
completion of the pre check-in security procedure. Sixty had been screened using CCE and 
60 had been screened using the aforementioned Suspicious Signs method (see Ormerod & 
Dando, 2015). Passenger pre check-in security screening interactions with the security agent 
were discretely digitally audio recorded, captured via a non-visible recording device. Signs 
were posted throughout the airport informing passengers that security interviews may be 
recorded. Passengers were naïve to the different screening conditions. All agreed to complete 
the passenger survey prior to passing through central baggage search. 
The purpose of the survey was explained using a script. Included in the script was 
information regarding the ethics of the research, the impartiality of the researcher and that 
responses were entirely anonymous. Passengers were asked a series of questions by the 
researcher, who contemporaneously completed a paper-based questionnaire, immediately 
recording passengers’ responses to each question in turn. During this time each respondent 
was standing immediately next to the researcher. The respondent was then asked to sign and 
date the paper-based questionnaire before being thanked for their time, and provided with a 
general information sheet, which included the contact details of the researcher. 
Our sample of genuine passengers comprised 73 men and 47 females. One hundred 
and fifteen passengers (96%) had flown to the US before and all had flown on a US carrier. 
Five participants (4%) had not flown to the US before. Sixty-six (55%) of our sample were 
flying with carrier A, the remaining 54 (45%) were flying with carrier B. Opportunity 
sampling meant that we were unable to control for factors such as gender, age, income and 
occupation, all of which can impact on perceptions of service and satisfaction (e.g., Clemes et 
al., 2008).
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The questionnaire comprised 10 questions. The first four asked passengers their age 
range, gender, whether they had flown to the USA before and if so whether they had 
previously flown with either of the carriers in question. The following 4 question asked 
passengers to rate their pre check-in security experience using a Likert type scale ranging 
from 1 to 5 (e.g., 1 = Unhappy/Too long/Unacceptable; 5 = Happy/Ideal/Very acceptable). 
The ninth question was a ten-point Net Promoter scale, included to understand each 
passenger’s satisfaction level. The final question was an open-ended invitation asking 
passengers to comment on any aspect of the pre check-in security.
3. Analysis
We employed a mixed methods approach. First, digital recordings of the passenger 
screening interactions (collected using covert voice activated recording devoices worn by 
security personnel) were transcribed, verbatim. Two independent coders then coded all 120 
transcripts for number of questions asked by screeners, passenger words, and unique 
information items revealed by each passenger in response to screener questions. Inter-coder 
reliability for was high: r (120) = .910, p < .001; r (120) = .897, p < .001; r (120) = .908, p < 
.00, respectively. Univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA) was used to calculate and 
compare the number of questions asked, passenger words and unique information items 
revealed, and to analyse passenger responses to each of the post screening questions across 
the two screening groups (CCE Vs. Suspicious Signs). Content analyses was used to convert 
qualitative responses to the open-ended invitation to comment on any aspect of pre check-in 
security into quantitative data.  
4. Results
Examination of the number of questions asked by screeners, the number of words 
spoken by passengers, and the number of unique information items reveled by passengers 
revealed significant differences between CCE and suspicious signs interviews. CCE trained 
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agents asked fewer questions, M CCE = 10.12, CI 95% [9.32; 10.92], than suspicious signs 
agents, M SS = 27.22, CI 95% [23.50; 27.50], F (1, 118) = 302.461, p < .001, η2 = .87. 
Genuine passengers screened using CCE uttered more words M CCE = 202.78, CI 95% 
[193.85; 211.72], than those screened using suspicious signs, M SS = 25.65, CI 95% [23.64; 
27.66], F (1, 118) = 1489.220, p < .001, η2 = .80. Passengers screened using CCE also 
revealed more information items, M CCE = 18.45, CI 95% [17.23; 19.67], than passengers 
screened using suspicious signs, M SS = 1.03, CI 95% [0.51; 1.56], F (1, 118) = 688.004, p < 
.001, η2 = .79.  Interview duration did not significantly differ across conditions, F (1, 118) = 
108.300, p = .849 (M CCE = 3.12 minutes, M SS = 2.45 minutes). 
Analyses of the four pre check-in security experience questions (applying 
Bonferroni’s correction) revealed one significant main effect of screening method (see Table 
1 for means and SDs). Participants in the CCE condition found the pre check-in security 
experience more enjoyable than those screened using the suspicious signs method, F (1, 116) 
= 13.323, p < .001, η2 = .10. All other main effects of Carrier and the Procedure X Carrier 
interactions for the remaining three Likert questions (duration of the procedure; how 
acceptable did you find the procedure; were you happy to reveal information about yourself 
and your plans) were non-significant, all Fs < 5.894, all ps, > .012. There was a significant 
main effect of screening condition for responses to the ten-point Net Promoter question. 
Participants in the CCE condition were ‘promoters’ whereas those in the suspicious signs 
condition were ‘detractors’, F (1, 116) = 24.802, p < .001, η2 = .18. The main effect of 




Means and standard deviations for passenger (N = 120) feedback to questions 5 to 9 of the 
post security procedure questionnaire.  
CCE SS
How enjoyable did you find the security screening process 4.48 (.78)* 3.06 (1.27)
How happy were you to share personal information with the security staff 4.52 (.77) 4.40 (.92)
How did you feel about the time taken to complete the security procedure 4.32 (1.11) 4.36 (1.09)
How acceptable did you find the security screening procedure 4.62 (.76) 4.18 (1.28)
Based solely on the security procedure, on a scale of 0-10 how likely is it that you
would recommend travelling with this airline
8.63 (2.02)* 6.23 (2.54)
* p < .001
Mean (SD)
Content analyses of the final open-ended invitation to comment on any aspect the pre 
check in security procedure resulted in the emergence of three primary themes, which we 
have labeled i) agent conduct (all comments regarding the conduct of screening agents), ii) 
procedure (general comments concerning the screening procedure, but excluding efficacy 
comments) and iii) effectiveness. (comments directly related to perceived effectiveness of the 
screening procedure, only). Overall, 80 passengers (67% of the sample) answered this final 
question (52: 87% had been screened using CCE and 28: 47% had been screened using 
Suspicious Signs). Exemplar quotes are shown in Table 2. Of the 52 CCE passengers who 
answered this question 75% made general comments regarding the procedure, 69% 
commented on the conduct of the agent, and 71% on the effectiveness of the procedure. Of 
the SS screened passengers, 44% commented on the procedure, 20% on conduct of the agent, 
and 56% on the effectiveness of the procedure.  
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Table 2. 
Exemplar quotes from each of the primary themes that emerged from responses to Q 11 of 
the post-screening questionnaire. 
Procedure
 I was confused because they didn't ask anything about my luggage like they normally do (CCE)
I thought it was odd because of the personal questions. Not like normal (CCE)
Weird, but very worthwhile. Different from usual (CCE)
Confusing. Was is security? I am not sure (CCE)
Very Quick (SS)
Don’t like being asked about my history, its not your business. I like XXXX but not this procedure (CCE)
Effectiveness
Not useful and not thorough enough (SS)
Far superior security to the US procedure where they ask you no questions about nothing (CCE)
More intrusive questioning needed: wouldn’t mind opening my bag, wouldn’t mind getting here earlier to
be better screened (SS)
I am not sure how useful that was, he didn’t even ask to look in my bag. I could have been lying and how
would he know (SS)
Agent conduct




5. Discussion and Conclusion
The results of the passenger experience study reveal three important outcomes.  First, 
analyses of passenger and screening agent verbalisations during the security screening 
interview confirm that CCE does engage passengers in considerably more dialogue than the 
suspicious signs approach, and might therefore be predicted to seem more effortful and 
invasive from the passenger perspective. Second, despite the higher levels of engagement 
required of passengers, CCE yielded greater enjoyment and higher recommender scores than 
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the suspicious signs method.  Third, notwithstanding significant differences between the two 
methods, overall passengers seemed to accept and recognise the value of both methods.  The 
latter result is the first we are aware of in which passengers’ willingness to submit to security 
screening procedures has been assessed, with encouraging results. 
Taken together, the results suggest that it is possible to design an effective behaviour-
based security screening procedure without sacrificing customer experience. Indeed, we have 
anecdotal evidence, supported by the qualitative results of this study, that many passengers 
had their travelling experience enhanced by going through the CCE channel.  A CCE 
interview with a legitimate passenger feels like an informal conversation: the passenger talks 
about themselves, their experience, skills and knowledge (see Ormerod & Dando, 2015; 
Dando & Ormerod, 2019).  An effective CCE interviewer will put the passenger at their ease 
and hence enhance their travelling experience.  The contrast between the informal approach 
of CCE and the much more formal, indeed almost adversarial, approach of most other 
screening methods is stark. We contend that the informal basis of CCE is an important part of 
the method’s effectiveness. To deliver an effective veracity test, which in CCE is the use of 
unexpected tests of expected knowledge (see Parkhouse & Ormerod, 2018), requires that the 
screening agent can observe a change in behaviour, but this has to be screener initiated and 
controlled. This change is from a baseline where the deceptive passenger is not under 
challenge to a to a heightened behavioural state in which the passenger is challenged by being 
required to answer an unexpected question to which they know they should be able to provide 
an answer.  The conditions for effective questioning coincide with those that deliver a more 
enjoyable customer experience for genuine travellers. 
Aviation security is costly, and so it seems sensible to consider whether a CCE 
interview at check-in might offer an effective risk-based method for triaging all passengers - 
treating all passengers equally, rather than profiling. Lower risk passengers are those who 
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satisfy CCE screeners on all six aspects of the method that can discriminate deceivers from 
truth tellers. Lower risk, truth tellers could then undergo less invasive and less time 
consuming security procedures as they move through the airport. Deceptive passengers are 
immediately viewed as a security threat and so are higher risk and subjected to more stringent 
security thereby targeting limited resources.  
This research surveyed genuine passengers, but the sample was not large, which is a 
limitation. However, our findings do concur with those of other researchers who used a larger 
sample of homogenous respondents who were asked to provide feedback on past experiences 
(Alards-Tomalin et al., 2014). Further, we were significantly constrained by time and a 
number of environmental factors associated with surveying genuine passengers and so were 
unable to distinguish between different sub-groups of passengers, and our survey questions 
were fairly brief and generally worded so as to be understood by the majority of passengers. 
However, the survey did tap into passenger’s first-hand, recent experiences, which is a 
strength. Future research in this evolving domain should seek to develop in-depth methods 
for quickly collecting data regarding first-hand, recent experiences from larger numbers of 
genuine passengers, including controlling for sub-groups (culture; experience; business; age). 
Post the 9/11 terrorist attacks, billions of dollars have been invested in aviation 
security procedures (United States Government Accountability Office, 2017). However, the 
effectiveness of these procedures has long been questioned (Weinberger, 2010) and continues 
to be questioned particularly in light of the lack of empirical evaluation and theoretical 
support (United States Government Accountability Office, 2015; 2017). Agile security 
agencies that proactively engage in high quality research and development and who interact 
with the traveling public as co-creators when doing so are those most likely to outmatch a 
dynamic threat. Aviation security relies on the mitigation of risk through rule compliance, but 
passengers have choice as to which carrier they choose to use when flying into the USA, and 
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so if security procedures are not acceptable, at best passengers may chose alternative carriers. 
More importantly, they may begin to consider bending and breaking the rules, and so 
passengers should be treated as active participants in security. Indeed, recent research has 
indicated that where aviation security is perceived as negative it becomes less effective (e.g., 
Hasisi & Weisburd, 2011; Alards-Tomalin et al., 2014).
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